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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of insurance contract design on the 
behavior of filing fraudulent claims in an experimental setup. We test how 
fraud behavior varies for insurance contracts with full coverage, a straight 
deductible or variable premiums (bonus-malus contract). In our experiment, 
filing fraudulent claims is a dominant strategy for selfish participants, with 
no psychological costs of committing fraud. While some people always 
commit fraud, a substantial share of people only occasionally or never 
defraud. In addition, we find that deductible contracts may be perceived as 
unfair and thus increase the extent of claim build-up compared to full 
coverage contracts. In contrast, bonus-malus contracts with variable 
insurance premiums significantly reduce the filing of fictitious claims 
compared to both full coverage and deductible contracts. This reduction 
cannot be explained by monetary incentives. Our results indicate that 
contract design significantly affects psychological costs and, consequently, 
the extent of fraudulent behavior of policyholders. 
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1 Introduction 
Practitioners and theorists commonly agree that fraudulent behavior by policyholders is – in 
addition to classical adverse selection and moral hazard problems – one of the main threats 
for insurance companies.  Important forms of insurance fraud are fictitious claims and claim 
build-up.  People may take advantage of private information and claim losses that never 
occurred (fictitious claims) or exaggerate the size of an actual insured loss (claim build-up).  
Insurance firms take this threat very seriously as they spend much effort on fraud detection 
systems and claim processing (Dionne et al. 2009).
1
  Because fraud is difficult to 
unambiguously verify ex-post, estimates of the total amount of fraud are not undisputed 
(Derrig, 2002).  However, Caron and Dionne (1997) estimate that about 10% of all claims in 
the Quebec automobile insurance market can be attributed to some form of fraudulent 
behavior.  These claims would add up to about 113.5 million Canadian dollars per year. 
While the extent of fraud is hard to measure, it is even harder to examine factors that 
influence fraudulent behavior.  However, these factors are of great importance for insurance 
companies in the fight against insurance fraud.  Up to now, most of the theoretical research 
that examines optimal ways to abate insurance fraud has been based on standard economic 
theory.  Currently, two main models are considered: Costly State Falsification (Crocker and 
Morgan, 1998) and Costly State Verification (Townsend, 1979; Picard, 1996).  In both 
models, individuals are assumed to be selfish and amoral such that they only evaluate 
expected monetary gains and sanctions when deciding to defraud (Becker, 1968).  In fact, 
Dionne and Gagné (2002) provide real-world evidence that the potential gains of fraudulent 
activities may influence behavior.  They show that, in the Canadian auto insurance industry, 
the probability of theft for contracts with generous two-year replacement coverage is 
significantly higher near the end of the second year, when potential fraud gains are highest. 
However, there is now a great deal of evidence that only some people behave strictly 
selfishly, while others consider norms or fairness (Ichino and Maggi, 2000; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999).  For instance, in line with findings from Falk and Fischbacher (1999), some 
people would never consider engaging in illegal behavior, like insurance or tax fraud, due to 
                                                 
1  Related empirical studies like, e.g., Artís et al. (1999, 2002), Brockett et al. (1998, 2002), Dionne and Gagné 
(2001), Derrig and Ostaszewski (1995) and Viaene et al. (2002), identify observable characteristics of 
fraudulent claims, which can improve the detection of insurance fraud and claim processing in general. 
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norms.
2
  Regarding the consequences of fraudulent behavior, the results of Gneezy (2005) 
indicate that people do not exclusively care about their own gain from lying; they are also 
sensitive to the harm to others that lying causes.  Other work, like Spicer and Becker (1980), 
provides evidence that people who believe that they are treated unfairly by the tax system are 
more likely to evade taxes to restore equity.  Hence, norms and fairness effects might 
significantly affect fraudulent behavior.  In the context of insurance fraud, the impacts of 
norms and fairness are hard to measure in the field.  Consequently, analyzing these factors in 
the lab seems to be a promising approach.  To the best of our knowledge, the present study is 
the first experimental work that examines factors influencing insurance fraud. 
A closely related problem to the issue of insurance fraud is tax evasion.
3
  For 
example, Alm et al. (1999) show that norms play a crucial role in tax evasion behavior and 
that voting on fiscal rules or communication can affect these norms.  In addition, Gordon 
(1989) and Myles and Naylor (1996) argue that an individual can derive a psychic payoff 
from adhering to the standard pattern of reporting behavior in his reference group.  With 
respect to fairness considerations, one can distinguish vertical and horizontal fairness effects.  
Vertical fairness effects result from individuals’ beliefs that they are treated unfairly by the 
tax system (authority).  It has been shown that people holding such beliefs are more likely to 
evade taxes to restore equity (Spicer and Becker, 1980).  Additionally, Fortin et al. (2007) 
find evidence that taxpayers care about horizontal fairness when comparing their own tax 
burden with that of their peers.  A reduction in the mean tax rate of an individual’s peer 
group leads the individual to report lower income.  Hence, perceived unfair taxation may 
increase tax evasion.  
Our setup is closely related to public good experiments.  We employ a mutual 
insurance framework in which participants collectively bear risk in groups.  Each group 
member pays an insurance premium to a group account and can then claim indemnity 
payments from the latter.  As indemnities are associated with transaction costs and both 
deficits and surpluses are shared equally between group members, our setup resembles a 
public good (bad) situation.  It has been shown that social and/or internalized norms can 
                                                 
2  
 In fact, some theoretical models, like Picard (1996) or Boyer (2000), consider two types of policyholders: 
opportunists, who consider only the costs and benefits of their actions, and honest people, who never commit 
any insurance fraud. 
3
  See, e.g., Andreoni et al. (1998) for a review of major theoretical and empirical findings on tax evasion. 
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enforce cooperation in public good situations (Arrow, 1971a; Andreoni, 1990).  In addition, 
fairness issues play a prominent role as participants do not want to be exploited by others 
(Falk and Fischbacher, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  Thus, non-cooperative behavior can 
be triggered by expectations of detrimental behavior by others. 
There is some real-world evidence that fairness and norms also matter in insurance 
markets. As shown by Cummins and Tennyson (1996) and Tennyson (1997), claim 
frequencies in the US auto insurance industry are significantly related to stated attitudes 
towards dishonest behavior in general (norms).  The overall perception of insurance 
institutions, which can be seen as a proxy for vertical fairness, is another influencing factor. 
As norms are difficult to influence, insurance-specific factors that affect vertical fairness, like 
contractual arrangements, are crucial for fighting insurance fraud. 
In real-world insurance markets, two contractual arrangements are very common. 
First, deductible contracts specify a fixed amount of money that a policyholder herself must 
bear in the case of a loss.  It can be shown that such a contract form is optimal from a risk 
allocation perspective in situations with symmetric information and transaction costs (Arrow, 
1971b; Raviv, 1979).  However, more importantly, deductible contracts have been shown to 
be optimal in situations with asymmetric information, like adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Shavell, 1979).  Second, bonus-malus contracts entail 
variable premiums based on past claiming behavior.  Such contracts may alleviate adverse 
selection in a multi-period setting, give incentives for loss prevention and impede the filing 
of fictitious claims (Cooper and Hayes, 1987; Lemaire, 1985; Moreno et al, 2006). 
With respect to the impact of these contractual arrangements on vertical fairness, to 
the best of our knowledge, only limited evidence with respect to deductible contracts exists.  
Tennyson (2002) and Miyazaki (2009) find that the deductible size negatively influences 
perceptions of the ethicality and fairness of the insurance arrangement and therefore 
increases the acceptability of claim build-up.  In this respect, Dionne and Gagné (2001) 
estimate that, in the Canadian auto insurance industry, a deductible increase from $250 to 
$500 increases the average claim by 14.6%-31.8% (from $628 to $812).  Their results 
indicate that higher deductibles increase fraudulent activities and, in particular, claim build-
up.  Bonus-malus contracts may also influence insured parties’ fairness perception.  
Intuitively, these contracts could be perceived as unfair because subsequent insurance 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 5 
 
premiums are increased after a claim is made.  Consequently, even if policyholders are in the 
first place fully reimbursed for a loss, they face an implicit deductible as any indemnity is 
partly self-financed by higher future premiums. 
This paper reports the results of a newly developed insurance experiment.  
Participants are allocated into fixed groups of four.  In each of five periods, participants have 
to insure against potential losses.  Insurance is organized in a mutual setup where premiums 
and indemnity payments are borne collectively by all group members.  In each period, 
participants can freely decide to claim an indemnity irrespective of actual losses.  There are 
no sanctions for fraudulent behavior, but due to transaction costs and the mutual insurance 
setup, claims negatively affect the group members’ payoffs.  For a selfish individual, it is 
rational to claim the highest possible indemnity in each period. 
We performed three different treatments.  In the Base Treatment, premiums only 
cover expected actual losses and resulting transaction costs.  Available indemnities 
correspond to possible losses (full coverage).  In the Deductible Treatment, indemnities are 
kept constant in comparison to the Base Treatment, but all losses are increased by a fixed 
amount.  In the Bonus-Malus Treatment, there is full coverage, and premiums depend on 
prior claiming.  If a claim is made, premiums are increased for all subsequent periods; 
otherwise, they are decreased. 
In this paper, we analyze the impacts of the two main contractual insurance 
arrangements observed in practice.  We find that deductible contracts significantly increase 
claim build-up.  In the case of a loss, subjects seem to find it acceptable to recoup deductibles 
through claim inflation.  In addition to this intuitive result, there is also a spill-over effect as 
deductible contracts also increase the filing of fictitious claims.  Taken together, these results 
confirm that deductibles are perceived as unfair and trigger fraudulent behavior.  Our second 
main research focus is on contracts with claiming-dependent premiums (bonus-malus 
schemes).  In line with theoretical predictions, bonus-malus contracts significantly reduce the 
filing of fictitious claims in early periods.  However, our most important result is that full 
coverage bonus-malus contracts – which entail an implicit deductible – are seemingly not 
perceived as unfair: In the last period, when subjects do not have to fear any future premium 
adjustments, behavior is not significantly different from the Base Treatment. 
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When addressing problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, results from one-
period models suggest the use of deductibles to give policyholders optimal incentives.  
However, these contracts may lead to serious side effects as they can significantly increase 
fraudulent behavior.  Our findings indicate that, due to behavioral aspects, bonus-malus 
contracts are superior to deductible contracts in a multi-period setting.  These contracts can 
be designed to give the same incentives as deductibles without causing the same negative 
side effects.  Hence, insurance companies can use bonus-malus contracts as an effective 
means to address adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In addition, as theoretical 
models suggest, bonus-malus contracts reduce the filing of fictitious claims in situations 
where auditing of claims is either too costly or impossible. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the 
experimental design.  In section 3, we derive our predictions for the empirical analysis.  In 
section 4, we provide information about the subjects of the experiment.  Section 5 presents 
our results and discussion, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Experimental Design 
In the experiment, participants are randomly and anonymously allocated into fixed groups of 
four.  All payoffs during the experiment are calculated in the experimental currency “points”.  
After the experiment, points are converted into Euros at the rate of 1 point to 10 cents.  Each 
group plays five periods ( 5,...,1 == Tt ) of the following insurance game: Participants get a 
period endowment (W) and are informed that they have to insure against possible losses jx  
with HLj ,,0=  and HL xxx <<= 00 .  Losses in each period are identical and independently 
distributed, with 7.00 =p , 2.0=Lp  and 1.0=Hp .  Insurance is mandatory for each 
participant.  Thus, in every period, each group member must pay an insurance premium (P) 
to a group-specific insurance account that finances all indemnities (I) paid to the group 
members.  Hence, in our experiment, we apply a mutual insurance setup.  All payments from 
and to the group members are settled via the group-specific insurance account.  After the last 
period, the insurance account is automatically and equally balanced by all group members.  If 
the insurance account has a negative balance, all group members pay the same additional 
contribution.  On the other hand, a positive balance is equally shared by all group members.  
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The instructions, and therefore the whole experiment, were framed using insurance-specific 
wording.
4
  All information was common knowledge. The instructions can be found in the 
Appendix. 
With respect to indemnity claiming, we apply the strategy method.
5
   Before knowing 
the actual loss realization in period t, each participant is asked which indemnity she is going 
to claim for each possible loss.  In all treatments, participants can only claim one of three 
possible indemnities, 00 =I , 10=LI , or 15=HI , for each possible loss jx .  Hence, in each 
period, participants choose a claiming strategy ( ) ( ) ( )( )HLti xIxIxIs ,,0= , where 
( ) ( )HLj IIIxI ,,0∈ .  It is common knowledge that strategies directly determine individuals’ 
period payoffs.  We do not consider monitoring activities or punishments for players who 
lied.  Indemnities are always paid as claimed, but due to transaction costs of 40% ( 4.0=c ), 
the insurance account is charged with an amount of I⋅4.1  for each claim.  Therefore, the 
insurance account provides coverage against risk but is a costly means of reallocating 
premium and claim payments of the four group members. 
All periods are identical and consist of four steps: 
Step 1: Subjects confirm the payment of the insurance premium to the insurance account. 
Step 2: Each player has to decide upon her claiming strategy tis . 
Step 3: Players are informed about their actual loss tix~  in period t. 
Step 4: Actual indemnities ( )titi xII ~~ =  are paid according to tis . 
After the last period, the insurance account is automatically balanced by the group 
members.  Overall, we conducted three different treatments that are described below. 
                                                 
4
  For example, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) find that a context-free experiment framing does not have a 
significant impact on a bribery game.  Schoemaker and Kunreuther (1979) found a significant impact of an 
insurance framing on participants’ behavior in their survey.  We also conducted a context-free treatment and 
did not find any structural differences with respect to the insurance-specific wording in our Base Treatment.  
The respective results are available from the authors upon request. 
5
  This approach goes back to Selten (1967).  Participants have to state contingent responses for each 
information set, but only one response will result in an effective action and determine the responder’s and 
other players’ payoffs.  For example, Hoffmann et al. (1998), Brandts and Charness (2000), and Oxoby and 
MacLeish (2004) do not find any differences in behavior when using the strategy method in simple sequential 
games.  However, e.g., Blount and Bazermann (1996), Güth et al. (2001) and Brosig et al. (2003) found 
significant differences between the strategy method and unconditional decision making. 
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In our Base Treatment, the period endowment is 25=tW  and loss sizes are 10=Lx  
and 15=Hx .  As participants are able to claim { }15,10,0=jI  from the insurance account, 
this setup resembles a situation with a full-coverage insurance contract.  The insurance 
premium 5=tP  corresponds to expected losses including transaction costs.  It does not 
cover any fraudulent claims. 
In the Deductible Treatment (Deduct), both losses, Lx  and Hx , are increased by 5 
points to 15=Lx  and 20=Hx .  Participants are informed that there is a deductible of 5 
points, and thus they are only able to claim { }15,10,0=jI .  The premium is unchanged, but 
the endowment is increased to 27=tW  to cover the higher expected losses of 
1.254.13.0 =⋅⋅ .  That is, when a loss occurs (30% of the time), this loss is 5 points higher 
than in the Base Treatment, and transaction costs of 40% have to be taken into account. 
Finally, in the Bonus-Malus Treatment (BoMa), losses, the endowment, and 
indemnities are the same as in the Base Treatment ( 10=Lx , 15=Hx , 25=tW , 
{ })15,10,0=jI .  In this treatment, the insurance premium is conditioned upon past claims.  If 
participants received a positive payment 0~ >tiI , their subsequent premium 1+tiP  is increased 
by 2 points; otherwise, the subsequent premium decreases by 1 point.  The initial premium is 
51 =iP , and the premium in period t+1 is 
 
⎩⎨
⎧ =
+
−=+ 0
2
11
t
i
t
i
t
it
i
I
otherwise
if
P
P
P .        (1) 
 
3 Theoretical predictions 
3.1 Individual treatments 
In order to derive an optimal period strategy, we assume that individuals possess a non-
decreasing Bernoulli utility function ( ) 0>⋅iu .  For the Base and Deduct Treatments, behavior 
in period 1−t  does not affect decision making in period t  because premium payments are 
constant.  Furthermore, as participants are paid after the last period, it is straightforward to 
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assume that individuals do not discount their expected period utility tiU  and hence maximize 
∑= t tii uEU ][ . 
Related experimental research, like Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), has shown that 
people may experience psychological costs of committing fraud.  These costs may vary 
between individuals and may depend on the amount of money defrauded or on other factors, 
such as contractual arrangements.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that costs 
correspond to mi K⋅θ , where iθ  is continuously distributed in [ ]1,0  according to ( )θF  and 
Hm IK > .  These assumptions imply that costs vary by individual according to the factor iθ  
and are independent of the amount defrauded but may depend on the contractual arrangement 
in a treatment { }BoMaDeductBasem ,,∈ .  These costs only occur if the individual defrauds, 
so we define 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧ >⋅=
t
jj
t
imi
im
xxI
otherwise
ifK
0
θκ           (2) 
In line with Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), we assume that for each subject i’s decisions 
in period t, there is an identically and independently distributed random component, 
( )2,0~ σε Nit , that is added to the psychological costs of committing fraud imκ .  This error 
term represents some random added propensity for the subject to either commit fraud or not, 
which may be correlated with unobservable individual characteristics. 
In the Base and Deductible Treatments, expected utility in period t is given by  
       ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]( )∑ −++−+−−+−−= j t ijtititimjtitjtttijti IxIcPxIxPWupU 31441εκ     (3) 
where t iI−  denotes the expected indemnity payments claimed by all other group members 
except for individual i.  The individual thus receives her endowment tW , pays the premium 
tP , may incur a loss tjx  with probability jp , receives the indemnity ( )jti xI  and might incur 
psychological costs itim εκ +  for committing fraud.  In addition, the effect on the insurance 
account has to be considered.  After the last period, the individual will receive one quarter of 
the balance of the insurance account after all premium payments are collected and 
indemnities and transactions costs are paid.  As all four group members pay the flat premium 
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to the insurance account and receive one quarter of the account’s balance, the insurance 
premium cancels out.  Rearranging (3) and considering the transaction cost parameter 
4.0=c  gives 
 ( )( )∑ −−+−−= −j itimjtit itjttijti xIIxWupU εκ65.005.1 .    (4) 
In a high loss situation, there is no possibility to defraud, and each individual 
maximizes her state utility by claiming HI .  For the no loss situation, individuals can either 
honestly claim 00 =I  or file fictitious losses by claiming 10=LI  or 15=tHI .  Clearly, 
claiming HI  strictly dominates LI  because imκ  is independent of the claim size for 0>jI .  
As tW , tjx  and 
t
iI−05.1  are independent of the individual’s claiming behavior, there is no 
strategic interdependence between group members.  Here, the optimal action of i depends on 
the individual costs imκ .  Consequently, an individual i will only make a fictitious claim if 
itmiH KI εθ −−< 65.00 .           (5) 
As long as miHit KI θε −< 65.0 , individual i will make a fictitious claim in period t.  
On average, because [ ] 0=itE ε , the marginal individual with mθˆ  is indifferent between both 
possibilities, with 
DeductBasemwith
K
I
m
H
m ,0
65.0ˆ =>=θ .          (6) 
For the low loss situation, individuals can either honestly claim LI  or engage in claim 
build-up by demanding HI .  Similarly, the marginal individual with mθ~  is on average 
indifferent between both possibilities.  From (4) we get 
( ) DeductBasemwith
K
II
m
LH
m ,0
65.0~ =>−=θ          (7) 
In the Base and the Deduct Treatments, the assumption Hm IK >  directly implies 
1~,ˆ0 << θθ .  Hence, in the Base and the Deduct Treatments, an individual without any 
psychological costs 0=iθ  maximizes her expected utility by choosing 
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( ) ( ) tIIIs HHHiti ∀== ,,0θ .  In contrast, an individual with 1=iθ  would never commit any 
fraud and would therefore choose ( ) ( ) tIIIs HLiti ∀== ,,1 0θ . 
As iθ  is continuously distributed in [ ]1,0  and [ ] 0=itE ε , the expected overall fraud 
probability mp  for the population corresponds to ( )mF θˆ  and ( )mF θ~ , respectively.  Due to 
θθ ~ˆ > , we have ( ) ( )mm FF θθ ~ˆ >  for DeductBasem ,= .  Consequently, in the Base and 
Deduct Treatments, the fraud probability of fictitious claims is higher than that for claim 
build-up ( )mm pp ~ˆ > .  Furthermore, when the psychological cost parameter mK  increases, 
both fraud probabilities decrease as 0ˆ <∂∂ mm Kθ  and 0~ <∂∂ mm Kθ  hold. 
Proposition 1: In the Base and Deduct Treatments, individuals always claim high 
indemnities irrespective of the actual loss size if they have no psychological costs of 
committing fraud ( 0=iθ ).  If iθ  is continuously distributed in [ ]1,0  with ( )θF , 
( )2,0~ σε Nit  and Hm IK > , there will be three groups of individuals: those who always, 
those who never and those who sometimes commit fraud.  For both treatments, the fraud 
probabilities are constant for all periods and higher for fictitious claims ( )mm pp ~ˆ > .  When 
the psychological cost parameter mK  increases, the fraud probabilities decrease.  For 
DeductBase KK = , we get DeductBase pp ˆˆ =  and DeductBase pp ~~ = . 
 
In the BoMa Treatment, premiums depend on prior claiming.  Hence, optimal 
strategies can only be derived via backwards induction.  When deciding whether or not to 
claim an indemnity, individuals must now additionally consider the impact on future 
premium adjustments.  Thus, the individual’s utility in period t, including the future impact 
of current actions, is given by 
 
( )(
( ) ( )( )[ ])t ijtititititi
j itimj
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
j
tt
ij
t
i
IxIPPPP
xIPPxWupU
−−− +−Δ++Δ++
−−+Δ−−−= ∑
34.1341
εκ
.   (8) 
where tiPΔ  accounts for the sum of future premium adjustments, with 
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⎩⎨
⎧ =
−
−−=Δ 0
)(2
)( tit
i
I
otherwise
if
tT
tT
P . 
Rearranging (8) gives 
 
( ) ( )(
( ) ).05.165.0
4343
itim
t
ij
t
i
j
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
j
tt
ij
t
i
IxI
PPPPxWupU
εκ −−−+
Δ−Δ−−−−=
−
−−∑
    (9) 
Here, premiums do not cancel out.  However, premium payments ( ti
t
i
t
i PPP −− Δ,, ) and 
indemnities claimed by other group members ( t iI− ) are independent of the individual’s 
claiming strategy in period t.  As there are no future premium adjustments in period 5=t , 
clearly 05 =Δ iP  holds.  Consequently, optimal behavior in 5=t  is the same as in the Base 
and Deduct Treatments.  For all other periods, an individual has to trade off current 
indemnity payments and future premium adjustments. 
The net-benefit – including the effect on the insurance account – of an indemnity 
payment in each period is still ( ) itimjti xI εκ −−65.0 .  If a positive claim is made, the premium 
in each future period will be increased by 2 points.  Otherwise, the premium in each future 
period will be decreased by 1 point.  Given our reasoning above, the objective function for 
individuals in period t simplifies to 
 ( ) ( )( )∑ −−Δ−j itimtijtixI PxIjti εκ75.065.0max .      (10) 
Again, for the no loss situation, claiming HI  strictly dominates LI .  Here, the optimal 
action of i depends on the individual costs imκ , itε , and the future premium adjustments 
t
iPΔ75.0 , which decrease in t.  An individual makes a fictitious claim if 
( ) ( ) itmiH KtTItT εθ −−−−<− 5.165.075.0       (11) 
The marginal individual with tBoMaθˆ  is indifferent between both possibilities in period 
t with 
( ) 025.265.0ˆ >−−=
m
Ht
BoMa K
tTIθ .       (12) 
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As 0ˆ >∂∂ ttBoMaθ , the probability of a fictitious claim ( )tBoMatBoMa Fp θˆˆ =  increases in t. 
If BoMaBase KK =  holds, the probability of a fictitious claim BoMapˆ  is, for 4≤t , strictly lower 
than Basepˆ , and in t =5, both probabilities are the same ( )BoMaBase pp ˆˆ = . 
In the low loss situation, an individual may only engage in claim build-up by filing 
HI , but she can also either claim LI  or 0I .  In the latter two cases, there are no 
psychological costs.  It can be shown that individuals may prefer claiming 0I  instead of LI  
for 2≤t .  Therefore, underreporting may be relevant for the first two periods.  Such a so-
called “bonus hunger-strategy” in bonus-malus systems is well-known in insurance markets 
(Nini, 2009).  Here, individuals do not report (low) losses to save on future premium 
adjustments and get a premium bonus.  For 2≤t , the marginal individual is indifferent 
between claiming 0I  and HI .  Therefore, we get 
( ) ( ) 025.265.0~ 02 >−−−=≤
m
Ht
BoMa K
tTIIθ .      (13) 
In contrast, underreporting is never optimal for 3≥t .  The marginal individual with 
mθ~  is indifferent between claiming LI  and HI , which implies 
( )
Base
m
LHt
BoMa K
II θθ ~65.0~ 3 =−=≥          (14) 
Obviously, as 321 ~~~ ≥<< tBoMaBoMaBoMa θθθ  holds, the fraud probability in the low loss 
situation tBoMap~  increases in the first three periods and is subsequently constant.  An 
individual without any psychological costs ( )0=iθ  will always engage in claim build-up by 
claiming HI  in the situation of a low loss. 
In a high loss situation, underreporting is never optimal because 
( ) ( )tTItT H −−<− 5.165.075.0  holds for all t.  Thus, individuals always claim HI . 
As before, in the BoMa Treatment, an individual without any psychological costs 
( )0=iθ  maximizes her expected utility by choosing ( ) ( ) tIIIs HHHiti ∀== ,,0θ .  In contrast, 
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an individual with 1=iθ  would never commit fraud and therefore chooses 
( ) ( ) tIIIs HLiti ∀== ,,1 0θ . 
Proposition 2: In the no loss situation of the BoMa Treatment, the probability of fictitious 
claims ( )tBoMapˆ  is increasing.  In the low loss situation, the probability of claim build-up 
( )tBoMap~  increases in the first three periods and is subsequently constant. For BoMaBase KK = , 
we get Base
t
BoMa pp ˆˆ
4 <≤ , BasetBoMa pp ˆˆ 5 == , BasetBoMa pp ~~ 2 <≤  and BasetBoMa pp ~~ 3 =≥ . 
 
Given Propositions 1 and 2, we derive the following general predictions for our 
experiment.  
Prediction 1: In all three treatments, we expect to observe three groups of individuals: those 
who always, those who never, and those who sometimes commit fraud.  
Prediction 2: In the Base Treatment, the probability of fictitious claims is higher than that of 
claim build-up. 
Prediction 3: In the BoMa Treatment, the probability of fictitious claims is increasing.  The 
probability of claim build-up is only increasing for the first three periods and subsequently 
constant. 
 
3.2 Predictions for Treatment Effects 
3.2.1 Deductible Treatment 
In this treatment, an insurance contract with a deductible of 5 points per claim is offered.  
This setup meets two requirements:  First, as only losses are increased but indemnities are 
unchanged, actual gains resulting from fraudulent behavior are the same as in the Base 
Treatment.  Hence, according to Proposition 1, if insurance-specific factors do not have any 
impact on the psychological costs of fraud, behavior in this treatment should not be 
significantly different from the Base Treatment.  However, the deductible may trigger 
additional fraud if it is considered unfair.  Second, a player in the Deduct Treatment who 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 15 
 
suffers a low loss of 15 points will be fully reimbursed if she reports a high loss and thus 
claims a high indemnity of 15 points. 
In the Deductible Treatment, the tendency to defraud may be increased by the fact 
that some people seem to dislike deductibles.  Dionne and Gagné (2001) show that simple 
deductible contracts may create additional incentives for filing fraudulent claims.  In 
addition, a survey by Miyazaki (2009) reveals that the deductible amount influences 
perceptions of ethicality and fairness regarding insurance claim build-up.  A possible reason 
for this finding may be that people want to be completely reimbursed for all losses in an 
insurance relationship. 
Given these results, it is straightforward to assume the psychological cost parameter 
of committing fraud to be generally lower in the Deductible Treatment ( )BaseDeduct KK < .  Due 
to 0ˆ <∂∂ mm Kθ  and 0~ <∂∂ mm Kθ , the resulting fraud probabilities in the Deductible 
Treatment should be significantly higher for the no loss and low loss situations.  The 
psychological effect of the Deductible Treatment may be more pronounced for the low loss 
situation.  Here especially, the deductible may be perceived as unfair because individuals are 
not totally reimbursed for an honest claim. 
Prediction 4: The probabilities both for claim build-up and fictitious losses are significantly 
higher in the Deductible Treatment than in the Base Treatment.  
With respect to Proposition 1 and Prediction 2, one could expect that differences 
between the two fraud probabilities should also be significant in the Deductible Treatment. 
However, due to fairness effects resulting from the deductible, we expect the psychological 
costs for claim build-up to be lower compared to fictitious claims such that the effect on the 
difference is ambiguous. 
 
3.2.2 Bonus-Malus Treatment 
Moreno et al. (2006) show that bonus-malus contracts may provide significant incentives 
against insurance fraud in a multi-period model.  One main question in the BoMa Treatment 
is whether or not monetary rewards and punishments reduce the probability of fictitious 
claims, although the contracts are not incentive compatible in the sense that rational 
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individuals with no psychological costs prefer to defraud.  In addition, we want to test 
whether this insurance arrangement with variable premiums may be perceived as unfair and 
may therefore trigger fraudulent behavior.  To the best of our knowledge, no evidence exists 
about fairness aspects of bonus-malus contracts.  A comparison with the Base Treatment may 
lead to further insights. 
First of all, the decision problem in period 5=t  is equivalent to that of the Base 
Treatment if ti
t
i PP −=  holds.  Consequently, if BaseBoMa KK = , there should be no differences 
in claiming strategies between the BoMa and the Base Treatment in 5=t .  In addition, as 
Base
t
BoMa pp ~~
3 =≥ , we would expect to find no difference for claim build-up in 3≥t .  However, 
if BaseBoMa KK < , individuals perceive the bonus-malus contract as unfair, and the probability 
of claim build-up in period 5 should be significantly higher because there are no future 
premium adjustments.  Furthermore, in this case we would have Base
t
BoMa pp ~~
3 >≥ . 
In our view, behavior in periods 3-5 indicates whether or not bonus-malus contracts 
are perceived as unfair.  Given the lack of evidence for such fairness effects, we do not 
expect to find any differences. 
Prediction 5: In the Bonus-Malus Treatment, behavior in 5=t  is not significantly different 
compared to the Base Treatment. In addition, the probability of claim build-up in 3≥t  is 
also not significantly different. All other fraud probabilities (for fictitious claims in 4≤t , for 
build-up in 2≤t ) are significantly lower in the Bonus-Malus Treatment, as described in 
Proposition 2. 
Our experimental setup allows us to make another interesting comparison of 
perceived fairness.  As shown by Holtan (2001), the effective indemnity function of a full-
coverage bonus-malus contract is equivalent to an indemnity function of an insurance 
contract with a straight deductible.  He shows that the (implicit) deductible in a bonus-malus 
contract at a point in time t corresponds to the discounted difference of future premiums in 
periods t>τ .  In period 5=t , the deductible is zero as there are no future premiums to pay.  
In period 4=t , the deductible is 25.2375.0 =⋅  points because the future premium is 
increased by 2 points for one period if a claim is made or decreased by 1 point otherwise, and 
one fourth of each bonus-malus payment will later be reimbursed through the group account.  
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Accordingly, implicit deductibles for the other periods are: 4.5 points ( 3=t ), 6.75 points 
( 2=t ) and 9 points ( 1=t ). 
During periods 4≤t , there is a strictly positive implicit deductible, and in 5=t , 
there is full coverage.  As monetary incentives in the BoMa and Deduct Treatments are 
similar in t=2, we are able to compare both treatments with respect to perceived fairness.  
The deductible is 5 points in the Deduct Treatment, whereas the implicit deductible in the 
BoMa Treatment is 6.75 points in t=2.  Therefore, the implicit deductible in the BoMa is 
slightly higher than that in the Deduct Treatment.  If a bonus-malus contract is perceived as 
less unfair than a deductible contract ( )DeductBoMa KK > , individuals should commit less fraud, 
although they face a slightly higher implicit deductible.  More generally, we expect that this 
effect should be valid when 4≤t . 
Prediction 6: In the Bonus-Malus Treatment, the probability of fictitious claims is 
significantly lower in 2=t , and more generally when 4≤t , than in the corresponding 
periods of the Deductible Treatment. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
In a questionnaire after the experiment, several questions concerning the participants’ gender, 
general risk attitude, insurance experience (measured by the number of actual insurance 
contracts they have), and major were asked.  These variables are controlled for in our 
empirical analysis.  Prior studies offer some evidence of the impact of these variables on 
fraudulent behavior. 
First of all, in economic experiments, women often behave significantly differently than men 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  Tennyson (2002) reports that women are less likely to accept 
fraudulent behavior.  More specifically, Dean (2004) finds that women find claim build-up 
less ethical.  Both studies indicate that women should both file fewer fictitious claims and 
engage less in claim build-up.  Additionally, Tennyson (2002) also finds that questionnaire 
respondents with more insurance experience (more policies and more claims) are less 
accepting of insurance fraud.  As we only asked about the number of insurance policies held 
by each participant, we would expect that people with a higher number of contracts commit 
less fraud. 
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In line with Dohmen et al. (2009), we asked participants about their general willingness to 
take risk.  As shown by these authors, this method is a good predictor of risky behavior and 
respondents' risk attitudes.  Croson and Gneezy (2009) report that women are generally less 
willing to take risks.  However, based on our theoretical model above, we do not expect any 
significant impact of the willingness to take risks on fraudulent behavior.  However, findings 
from Gosh and Crain (1995) indicate that risk attitudes and ethical standards are correlated 
such that less risk-averse people have lower ethical standards.  Consequently, fraud 
probabilities may increase in the willingness to take risk.  Finally, students with a business or 
economics major have been shown to behave less pro-socially (Frey and Meier, 2004) and 
more corruptly in experimental settings (Frank and Schulze, 2000) than students with other 
majors.  Consequently, we expect that economics and business students are more likely to 
commit insurance fraud. 
 
4 Subjects 
All computerized experiments were conducted between March and July 2009 at the 
MELESSA laboratory of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University (LMU) in Munich, Germany. 
Recruitment was done using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004), and we employed the 
experimental software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  We conducted three sessions with 24 
participants for each of our three treatments.  A session took about 50-60 minutes.  Subjects 
were predominantly students from LMU with a great variety of majors.  The fraction of 
students with a business or economics major was about 16%.  All participants received a 
fixed show-up fee of 4 Euros.  Information on treatment earnings excluding show-up fees is 
reported in Table 1. 
Treatment Average earnings Earning range 
Base 8.85 (2.13) 3.80 – 14.30 
Deductible 9.33 (2.52) 3.70 – 16.50 
Bonus-Malus 9.50 (2.71) 4.50 – 12.60 
Table 1: Average treatment earnings (in Euros, standard deviations in parentheses) 
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5 Results 
First, we present some general results of the experiment.  Figures 1 and 2 show the 
probabilities of fictitious claims and claim build-up, respectively, per period and treatment. 
 
Figure 1: Fictitious claims per period and treatment 
 
Figure 2: Claim build-up per period and treatment 
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Figure 3 presents a summary of behavior per treatment over all periods. 
 
Figure 3: Fraudulent behavior per treatment 
In each period, subjects have two possible ways of committing fraud:  They can claim 
a low/high indemnity when they have incurred no loss, and/or they can claim a high 
indemnity when they have incurred a low loss (due to the strategy method, both choices are 
known).  Over all treatments, 14% to 24% of subjects never commit any kind of fraud, 
whereas 7% to 36% always commit fraud. The remaining 50% to 69% of subjects only 
sometimes commit fraud.  This finding confirms Prediction 1. 
Result 1: Prediction 1 is confirmed. 
In the Base Treatment, we expected to find a higher probability of fictitious claims 
than of claim build-up.  Comparing the respective fraud probabilities for all periods of 51% 
(fictitious claims) and 39% (build-up) gives some evidence for a significant difference 
between the two.  A Pearson's chi-square test shows that the difference is statistically 
significant, 888.92 =χ  ( 002.0=p , two-sided).  
Result 2: Prediction 2 is confirmed. 
Visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that both fraud probabilities are generally 
increasing over time.  Even though there is no feedback in our Base Treatment, subjects tend 
to commit more fraud in later periods.  This behavior is in contrast to Proposition 1.  
However, it is a common finding in experiments.  For example, Fischbacher and Heusi 
(2008) find that participants who took part in their experiment a second time lied more often 
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than they did the first time. More generally, Sonnemans et al. (1998) show in their public bad 
experiment that cooperative behavior declines over time. 
For the BoMa Treatment, we expect that the probability of fictitious claims is 
increasing.  In addition, the probability of claim build-up is expected to increase only for the 
first three periods and then subsequently be constant. As Figure 1 shows, the positive period 
effect in the no loss situation is mainly driven by the last period.  A random effects logit 
regression (Table A1, column 1) shows a highly significant period effect for periods 1-5.  
However, when considering only periods 4≤t , it can be shown that this effect is no longer 
significant.  This result indicates that – irrespective of the potential gain from fraudulent 
behavior – premium adjustments have a significant deterrent effect on the filing of fictitious 
claims.  In the no loss situation, premium increases are somehow sunk when underreporting 
is no option.  Here, the results (Table A1, columns 2 and 3) are mostly in line with Prediction 
3.  For 3≤t , there is a significantly positive period effect (p < 0.008).  Although the period 
effect is weakly significant for  4≥t  (p < 0.085), the overall regression results are no longer 
significant. 
Result 3: Prediction 3 is mostly confirmed.  In the BoMa Treatment, the probability of 
fictitious claims is only increasing between periods 4 and 5.  The probability of claim build-
up is, as predicted, only significantly increasing for the first three periods. 
When comparing behavior in the Base and the Deduct Treatments, Figure 2 shows 
that, for all periods, people commit less fraud in the Base Treatment.  In order to assess the 
significance of these differences, we conducted a pooled random effects logit regression for 
panel data.  Our regression results (Table A2) show that, in the build-up regression, the 
dummy for the Deductible Treatment is significant (p < 0.042).  For the filing of fictitious 
claims, results are weaker.  The treatment dummy is only significant for 4≤t  (p < 0.074).  
Result 4: Prediction 4 is mostly confirmed.  In the Deductible Treatment, the probability of 
claim build-up is significantly higher than in the Base Treatment.  The probability of 
fictitious claims is only higher when considering the first four periods. 
Subsequently, we want to check whether or not participants might perceive the BoMa 
arrangement as unfair and choose to retaliate.  Therefore, we compare claiming behavior in 
the Base and BoMa Treatments for 5=t , where fraudulent behavior has no future payoff 
consequences given the bonus-malus scheme.  Subjects in the BoMa Treatment could thus 
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wait until the last period before committing fraud.  The estimates of the pooled random 
effects logit regression are displayed in Table A3, columns 1 and 2, in the Appendix.  We 
find no significant differences between treatments.  In addition, when comparing the build-up 
behavior for periods 3≥t  (Table A3, columns 3), we also find no significant treatment 
effects.  Thus, in our experiment, subjects seem not to consider the bonus-malus scheme as 
unfair as they do not take advantage of the opportunity to retaliate by committing fraud in the 
last period(s). 
In a second step, we examine the probabilities of filing fictitious claims in periods 
4≤t   (Table A4).  As expected, subjects file fewer fictitious claims in the BoMa Treatment, 
and the treatment difference is highly significant (p < 0.014).  Although Figure 1 shows a 
difference in the probabilities of claim build-up for 2≤t , this difference is not statistically 
significant. 
Result 5: Prediction 5 is mostly confirmed. Behavior in t=5 is not significantly different 
between the Bonus-Malus and the Base Treatments.  For 3≥t , probabilities of claim build-
up are also not significantly different.  For 4≤t , probabilities for fictitious claims are 
significantly lower in the BoMa Treatment.  However, for 2≤t , probabilities for claim 
build-up are lower in the BoMa Treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Finally, we compare behavior in the Deduct and the BoMa Treatments.  While there 
is a constant deductible of 5 points in the Deduct Treatment, the implicit deductible decreases 
in the BoMa Treatment from 9 points (t = 1) to 6.75 points (t = 2), 4.5 points (t = 3) and 
finally 2.25 points (t = 4).  Although the deductibles in t = 2 are at 5 points (Deduct 
Treatment) and 6.75 points (BoMa Treatment), similar - and even higher in the BoMa 
Treatment - individuals commit significantly less fraud in the BoMa Treatment.  Table A5 in 
the Appendix displays the pooled random effects logit regression estimates for the Deduct 
and BoMa Treatments in t = 2.
6
 
Comparing both treatments for 4≤t  suggests that there is significantly less claim 
build-up in the BoMa Treatment.  Estimates for these regressions are displayed in Table A6 
in the Appendix.  In both regressions, the dummy variables for the BoMa Treatment are 
negative and significant (p < 0.000 for fictitious claims and p < 0.011 for build-up). 
                                                 
6
 We find similar results for t = 3, where the implicit deductible in the BoMa Treatment is 4.5 points and thus 
slightly lower than in the Deduct Treatment. 
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Result 6: Prediction 6 is confirmed. 
When comparing all three treatments, we find that bonus-malus contracts are 
seemingly not perceived as being as unfair as deductible contracts.  Furthermore, when 
comparing these contracts to full insurance contracts, we find that contracts with claim-
dependent premiums also lead to a lower fraud extent with respect to fictitious claims.  Thus, 
bonus-malus contracts combine the advantage of a lower net benefit compared to full 
coverage contracts with fixed premiums and are perceived as less unfair than deductible 
contracts.  This contract type therefore seems to be preferable to reduce the extent of 
fraudulent claims. 
 
6 Conclusions 
The goal of our experimental study was to evaluate the impact of contractual arrangements 
on insurance fraud.  Our results indicate that contract design may affect claiming behavior 
considerably.  Even if filing a fraudulent claim is a dominant strategy for selfish individuals, 
a significant share of people does not defraud.  One important finding is that deductible 
insurance contracts are seemingly perceived as unfair because the extent of fraudulent claims 
is significantly higher compared to a full insurance contract. 
Our results further indicate that bonus-malus contracts with a variable claim-
dependent premium are seemingly not perceived as unfair.  In fact, these contracts 
significantly reduce the extent of fictitious claims compared to a situation with fixed 
premiums.  This effect is mainly due to the decreased net benefit of a fraudulent claim.  Most 
notably, the fraud-reducing effect of bonus-malus contracts with full coverage is surprising 
from a theoretical point of view as these contracts are payoff-equivalent to deductible 
contracts.  Our analysis implies that bonus-malus contracts are a good means of reducing the 
filing of fictitious claims.  One can presume that bonus-malus contracts reduce monetary 
fraud benefits but do not imply the same negative consequences from fairness effects as 
equivalent deductible contracts. 
 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 24 
 
References 
Abbink, K. and H. Hennig-Schmidt, 2006, Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery 
game, Experimental Economics 9: 103-121. 
Alm, J., G.H. MacClelland, and W.D. Schulze, 1999, Changing the Social Norm of Tax 
Compliance by Voting, Kyklos 52: 141-171. 
Andreoni, J., 1990, Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow 
giving, Economic Journal 100: 464-477. 
Andreoni, J., B. Erard, and J. Feinstein, 1998, Tax Compliance, Journal of Economic 
Literature 36: 818-860. 
Arrow, K.J., 1971a, Political and economic evaluation of social effects and externalities, in: 
Intrilligator, M. (Ed.), Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, Amsterdam. 
Arrow, K.J., 1971b, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Chicago. 
Artís, M., M. Ayuso, and M. Guillén, 1999, Modelling different Types of Automobile 
Insurance Fraud Behaviour in the Spanish Market, Insurance: Mathematics and 
Economics 24: 67-81. 
Artís, M, M. Ayuso, and M. Guillén, 2002, Detection of Automobile Insurance Fraud with 
Discrete Choice Models and Missclassified Claims, Journal of Risk and Insurance 
69: 325-340. 
Becker, G.S.S., 1968, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political 
Economy 76: 169-217. 
Blount, S. and M. Bazerman, 1996, The inconsistent evaluation of absolute versus 
comparative payoffs in labor supply and bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 30: 227-240. 
Boyer, M.M., 2000, Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation, Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance Theory 25: 159-178. 
Brandts, J. and G. Charness, 2000, Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference 
Stability in Experimental Games, Experimental Economics 2: 227-238. 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 25 
 
Brockett, P.L., X. Xia, and R.A. Derrig, 1998, Using Kohonen’s Self-Organizing Feature 
Map to Uncover Automobile Bodily Injury Claims Fraud, Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 65: 245-274. 
Brockett, P.L., R.A. Derrig, L.L. Golden, A. Livine, and M. Alpert, 2002, Fraud 
Classification Using Principal Component Analysis of RIDITs, Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 69: 341-372. 
Brosig, J., J. Weimann, and C.-L. Yang, 2003, The hot versus cold effect in a simple 
bargaining experiment, Experimental Economics 6: 75-90. 
Caron, L. and G. Dionne, 1997, Insurance Fraud Estimation: More Evidence from the 
Quebec Automobile insurance industry, Assurances 64: 567-578. 
Cooper, R. and B. Hayes, 1987, Multi-period Insurance Contracts, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 5, 211-222. 
Crocker, K.J. and J. Morgan, 1998, Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud 
Through Optimal Incentive Contracts, Journal of Political Economy 106: 355-375. 
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy, 2009, Gender Differences in Preferences, Journal of Economic 
Literature 47: 1-27. 
Cummins, J.D. and S. Tennyson, 1996, Moral hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from 
Automobile Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 12: 29-50. 
Dean, D.H., 2004, Perceptions of the Ethicality of Consumer Insurance Claim Fraud, Journal 
of Business Ethics 54: 67-79. 
Derrig, R.A., 2002, Insurance Fraud, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 69: 271-287. 
Derrig, R.A. and K.M. Ostaszewski, 1995, Fuzzy Techniques of Pattern Recognition in Risk 
and Claim Classification, Journal of Risk and Insurance 62: 447-482. 
Dionne, G. and R. Gagné, 2001, Deductible Contracts against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence 
from Automobile Insurance, Review of Economics and Statistics 83: 290-301. 
Dionne, G. and R. Gagné, 2002, Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in 
Automobile Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 24: 213-230. 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 26 
 
Dionne, G., F. Giuliano, and P. Picard, 2009, Optimal Auditing with Scoring: Theory and 
Application to Insurance Fraud, Management Science 55: 58-70. 
Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp, and G.G. Wagner, 2009, Individual 
Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences, mimeo, 
Maastricht University. 
Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher, 1999, “Crime” in the Lab – Detecting Social Interaction, 
European Economic Review 46: 859-869. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter, 2000, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 
American Economic Review 90: 980-994. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt, 1999, A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114: 817-851. 
Fischbacher, U., 2007, Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, 
Experimental Economics 10: 171-178. 
Fischbacher, U. and F. Heusi, 2008, Lies in Disguise - An Experimental Study on Cheating, 
mimeo, University of Konstanz. 
Fortin, B., G. Lacroix, and M.-C. Villeval, 2007, Tax evasion and social interactions, 
European Economic Review 91: 2089-2112. 
Frank, B. and G.G. Schulze, 2000, Does economics make citizens corrupt?, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 43: 101-113. 
Frey, B.S. and S. Meier, 2004, Pro-Social behavior in a natural setting, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 54: 65-88.  
Gneezy, U., 2005, Deception: The Role of Consequences, American Economic Review 95: 
384-394. 
Gordon, J.P.F., 1989, Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion, 
European Economic Review 33: 797-805. 
Gosh, D. and T.L. Crain, 1995, Ethical standards, attitudes toward risk, and intentional 
noncompliance: an experimental investigation, Journal of Business Ethics 14: 353-
365. 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 27 
 
Greiner, B., 2004, An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments, in: Kremer, K. 
and V. Macho (Eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen, GWDG Bericht 
63, Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, Göttingen, 79-93. 
Güth, W., S. Huck, and W. Müller, 2001, The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games, 
Games and Economic Behavior 37: 161-169. 
Hoffman, E., K.A. McCabe, and V.L. Smith, 1998, Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: 
experimental economics and evolutionary psychology, Economic Inquiry 36: 335-
352. 
Holtan, J., 2001, Optimal Loss Financing under Bonus-Malus Contracts, Astin Bulletin 31: 
161-173. 
Ichino, A. and G. Maggi, 2000, Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining 
Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115: 1057-1090. 
Lemaire, J., 1985, Automobile Insurance: Actuarial Models, Boston. 
Miyazaki, A.D., 2009, Perceived Ethicality of Insurance Claim Fraud: Do Higher 
Deductibles Lead to Lower Ethical Standards?, Journal of Business Ethics 87: 589-
598. 
Moreno, I., F.J. Vázquez, and R. Watt, 2006, Can Bonus-Malus Allieviate Insurance Fraud?, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance 73: 123-151. 
Myles, G.D. and R.A. Naylor, 1996, A model of tax evasion with group conformity and 
social customs, European Journal of Political Economy 12: 49-66. 
Nini, G., Ex-post Behavior in Insurance markets, mimeo, University of Pennsylvania. 
Oxoby, R.J. and K.N. McLeish, 2004, Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in 
ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behaviour, 
Economics Letters 84: 399-405. 
Palfrey, T.R. and J.E. Prisbrey, 1997, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: 
How Much and Why?, American Economic Review, 87: 829-846. 
Picard, P., 1996, Auditing Claims in insurance Markets with Fraud: The Credibility Issue, 
Journal of Public Economics 63: 27-56. 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 28 
 
Raviv, A., 1979, The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy, American Economic Review 
69: 84-96. 
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
90: 629-649. 
Schoemaker, P.J.H. and H.C. Kunreuther, 1979, An Experimental Study of Insurance 
Decisions, Journal of Risk and Insurance 46: 603-618. 
Selten, R., 1967, Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen 
Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments, in: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beiträge 
zur Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, 136-168. 
Shavell, S., 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 541-
562. 
Sonnemans, J., A. Schram, and T. Offerman, 1998, Public Good Provision and Public Bad 
Prevention: The Effect of Framing, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
34: 143-161. 
Spicer M. and L.A. Becker, 1980, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental 
Approach, National Tax Journal 33: 171-175. 
Tennyson, S., 1997, Economic Institutions and Individual Ethics: A Study of Consumer 
Attitudes toward Insurance Fraud, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
32: 247-265. 
Tennyson, S., 2002, Insurance Experience and Consumers' Attitude Towards Insurance 
Fraud, Journal of Insurance Regulation 21: 35-55. 
Townsend, R.M., 1979, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State 
Verification, Journal of Economic Theory 21: 265-293. 
Viaene, S., R.A. Derrig, B. Baesens, and G. Dedene, 2002, A Comparison of State-of-the-Art 
Classification Techniques for Expert Automobile Insurance Fraud Detection, Journal 
of Risk and Insurance 69: 373-421. 
 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 29 
 
Appendix 
The probabilities of filing a fictitious claim (in the state of no loss) or engaging in claim 
build-up (in the state of a low loss) are considered as the dependent variables. Both variables 
equal 1 if that specific kind of fraud is committed and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
periods 1-5 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 1-3  
(2) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 3-5  
(3) 
Period 0.399 *** (0.101) 0.896 *** (0.339) 0.452 * (0.262) 
Gender (Female = 1) -0.611  (0.499) -1.444  (1.267) -1.383  (0.970) 
Risk 0.205  (0.154) 0.033  (0.380) -0.163  (0.296) 
Econ or business major 1.971 ** (0.882) 4.671 ** (2.315) 3.051 * (1.731) 
Insurance contracts 0.086  (0.202) 0.051  (0.502) 0.412  (0.394) 
Constant -2.374 *** (0.756) -3.579 * (1.906)) -1.645  (1.661) 
Number of observations 360   216   216   
Log-likelihood -202   -98   -116   
Wald chi-squared 22.73 ***  10.94 **  8.29   
Notes:  Random effects logit regression.      
Table A1: Logit Estimates for the BoMa Treatment 
 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
periods 1-5 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
periods 1-4 
(2) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 1-5 
(3) 
Treatment (Deduct = 1) 0.754  (0.593) 1.169 * (0.653) 2.068 ** (1.015) 
Period 0.337 *** (0.085) 0.434 *** (0.124) 0.531 *** (0.111) 
Gender (Female = 1) -1.256 * (0.641) -1.467 ** (0.703) -0.201  (1.070) 
Risk 0.602 *** (0.209) 0.633 *** (0.230) 0.963 *** (0.347) 
Econ or business major 0.759  (0.863) 0.843  (0.945) 2.501 * (1.332) 
Insurance contracts -0.631 *** (0.230) -0.734 *** (0.258) -0.169  (0.387) 
Constant -1.004  (0.867) -1.277  (0.960) -5.387 *** (1.521) 
Number of observations 720   576   720   
Log-likelihood -342   -277   -289   
Wald chi-squared 36.49 ***  33.28 ***  37.79 ***  
Notes:  Pooled random effects logit regression.      
Table A2: Logit Estimates for the Base and Deduct Treatments
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Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
period 5 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
period 5 
(2) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 3-5 
(3) 
Treatment (BoMa = 1) -0.250  (0.343) 0.137  (0.338) 0.205  (0.787) 
Period     0.462 ** (0.203) 
Gender (Female = 1) 0.115  (0.370) -0.129  (0.364) -0.405  (0.860) 
Risk 0.108  (0.120) 0.041  (0.118) 0.220  (0.277) 
Econ or business major 0.323  (0.654) 0.471  (0.628) 1.602  (1.499) 
Insurance contracts -0.074  (0.141) 0.196  (0.143) 0.283  (0.331) 
Constant 0.221  (0.512) -0.400  (0.507) -3.443 ** (1.484) 
Number of observations 144   144  432   
Log-likelihood -96   -98  -222   
LR chi-squared 1.79   2.97     
Wald chi-squared     7.94   
Notes:  Pooled logit regression (column 1) and pooled random effects logit regression (column 2).  
Table A3: Logit Estimates for the Base and BoMa Treatments 
 
 
 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
periods 1-4 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 1-2 
(2) 
Treatment (BoMA = 1) -1.213 ** (0.493) -0.854  (0.985) 
Period 0.327 *** (0.109) 0.627  (0.470) 
Gender (Female = 1) -0.916 * (0.522) -0.515  (1.094) 
Risk 0.345 ** (0.169) 0.613 * (0.358) 
Econ or business major 1.242  (0.903) 2.691  (2.255) 
Insurance contracts -0.148  (0.205) -0.376  (0.410) 
Constant -1.226  (0.766) -4.418 ** (1.749) 
Number of observations 576   288   
Log-likelihood -308   -141   
Wald chi-squared 23.39 ***  8.42   
Notes:  Pooled random effects logit regression. 
Table A4: Logit Estimates for the Base and BoMa Treatments
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Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
period 2 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
period 2 
(2) 
Treatment (BoMa = 1) -1.460 *** (0.382) -0.932 *** (0.362) 
Gender (Female = 1) -0.528  (0.407) -0.350  (0.390) 
Risk 0.230 * (0.128) -0.012  (0.122) 
Econ or business major 0.371  (0.547) 0.963 * (0.522) 
Insurance contracts -0.327 ** (0.159) -0.079  (0.145) 
Constant 0.690  (0.597) 0.361  (0.575) 
Number of observations 144   144   
Log-likelihood -84   -90   
LR chi-squared 30.13 ***  15.65 ***  
Notes:  Pooled logit regression.   
Table A5: Logit Estimates for the Deduct and BoMa Treatments (t=2) 
 
 
 
 
  
Dep. variable: 
fictitious claim, 
periods 1-4 
(1) 
Dep. variable: 
claim build-up, 
periods 1-4 
(2) 
Treatment (BoMa = 1) -2.047 *** (0.525) -2.141 ** (0.844) 
Period 0.232 ** (0.112) 0.581 *** (0.144) 
Gender (Female = 1) -1.412 *** (0.546) -1.623 * (0.896) 
Risk 0.457 *** (0.171) 0.209  (0.274) 
Econ or business major 1.728 ** (0.752) 3.351 *** (1.182) 
Insurance contracts -0.310  (0.198) -0.014  (0.334) 
Constant -0.002  (0.833) -1.037  (1.374) 
Number of observations 576   576   
Log-likelihood -285   -254   
Wald chi-squared 40.25 ***  36.14 ***  
Notes:  Pooled random effects logit regression.   
Table A6: Logit Estimates for the Deduct and BoMa Treatments (t=1-4) 
 Contract design and insurance fraud: an experimental investigation 32 
 
General instructions (all instructions translated from German) 
Welcome to the experiment.  Please read through the instructions carefully.  They are 
identical for all participants.  In this experiment, you and the other participants have to make 
decisions.  At the end of the experiment, you will receive a payment depending on your own 
decisions and the decisions of the other participants.  In addition, you will receive a fixed 
show-up fee of 4 Euro. 
During the whole experiment, you may not talk to other participants, use your mobile 
phone, or start any programs on the computer.  Should you break this rule, we unfortunately 
have to exclude you from the experiment and from receiving any payments.  Whenever you 
have a question, please raise your hand.  The experimenter will come to your seat to answer 
your question.  If the question is relevant for all participants, the experimenter will repeat the 
question and answer it aloud. 
During the experiment, we calculate payments in points instead of Euros.  At the end 
of the experiment, the total number of points will be converted into Euros at the rate of 10 
points = 1 Euro.  Before we start the experiment, you will have to answer 6 written questions 
regarding the experiment to make sure that you correctly understand the instructions. 
The experiment is confidential, meaning that no other participant will receive any 
information regarding your answers, decisions, or final payment. 
The experiment consists of two parts: In the first part, you will have to make 
decisions that will determine your success in the experiment and, consequently, your final 
payment.  In the second part, you will have to answer several questions that have no 
influence on your success in the experiment.  Your answers to these questions will be treated 
as strictly confidential. 
 
Specific instructions [D: Deductible Treatment; B: Bonus-Malus Treatment] 
The experiment consists of 5 periods.  Before period 1, you will be randomly and 
anonymously allocated into fixed groups of four.  The group composition remains unchanged 
during the whole experiment.  
At the beginning of each period, each participant receives an endowment of 25 
[Deduct: 27] points, thus totaling 125 [D: 135] points over 5 periods.  In each period, each 
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participant runs the risk of losing a part of his or her endowment.  The following losses can 
occur with the following probabilities in each period:  
 
Loss Probability 
0 points (no loss) 70 % 
10 [D: 15] points (low loss) 20 % 
15 [D: 20] points (high loss) 10 % 
 
In each period, given the above probabilities, a computer randomly determines for 
each participant independently if any of the above losses occurs.  The amounts of the 
potential losses and the probabilities remain constant over all periods.  Your decisions or 
losses in earlier periods thus have no influence on the probabilities or the amounts of future 
losses. 
In order to compensate for potential losses, the 4 group members together build a 
mutual insurance group.  This setup implies that each group member at the beginning of each 
period automatically pays an insurance premium of 5 points [BoMa: no points mentioned 
here] on a joint group account (“insurance account”). 
In order to receive payments from the insurance account, group members can retrieve 
indemnities from the insurance account.  [D: There is a deductible of 5 points.]  Each group 
member only has the possibility to retrieve 0 points, 10 points or 15 points from the 
insurance account.  If a group member retrieves an indemnity, he or she receives the 
corresponding amount from the insurance account.  The other group members have no 
influence on this payment; it will be made automatically. 
[BoMa: The insurance premium of each participant is 5 points in the first period.  The 
insurance premium in periods 2-5 is dependent on whether indemnities have been retrieved 
in earlier periods.  If, in a given period, an indemnity is retrieved from the insurance account, 
then the insurance premium in the next period increases by 2 points.  If no indemnity is 
retrieved, the insurance premium in the next period decreases by 1 point.  The following 
table summarizes this relation for the first 3 periods: 
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 … 
Premium Indemnity Premium Indemnity Premium … … 
yes 9 points … … 
yes 7 points 
no 6 points … … 
yes 6 points … … 
5 points 
no 4 points 
no 3 points … … 
end of insertion for BoMa] 
Any indemnity payment from the insurance account results in additional transaction 
costs of 40 percent.  Therefore, if a group member retrieves an indemnity of 10 points, the 
insurance account will be debited with 4 additional points (14 points overall).  If 15 points 
are retrieved, the insurance account will be debited with 6 additional points.  The following 
table summarizes this relation: 
Retrieved 
indemnity 
Transaction 
costs 
Total debit to the 
insurance account 
0 points 0 points 0 points 
10 points 4 points 14 points 
15 points 6 points 21 points 
 
Potential credit and debit balances of the insurance account are summed up over all 5 
periods.  During the experiment, you will receive no information regarding the balance of the 
insurance account.  After the last period, the insurance account is automatically and equally 
balanced by all group members.  If the insurance account has a negative balance, each group 
member has to pay one fourth of the balance from his or her winnings up to that point.  On 
the other hand, if the insurance account has a positive balance, each group member receives 
one fourth of the balance in addition to his or her winnings up to this point. 
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The timing of your decisions in each period is as follows: 
Step 1:  At the beginning of each period, you receive your period endowment of 25 [D: 
27] points. 
Step 2: You must acknowledge the payment of the insurance premium of 5 points [B: 
no points mentioned] to the insurance account. 
Step 3: You will make 3 decisions in each period: For each potential loss situation, 
you will have to decide how many points you will retrieve from the insurance 
account.  Thus, for a situation in which you have not incurred a loss, you have 
to decide whether you want to retrieve 0 points, 10 points, or 15 points from 
the insurance account.  You must make the same decision twice more for the 
situations in which you have incurred a low loss or a high loss, respectively. 
Step 4: Only after you have made all three decisions will you find out whether you 
have indeed incurred a loss in this period.  If you have incurred a loss, you will 
also learn whether it was a low or a high loss.  You will then automatically 
receive the indemnity from the insurance account that you requested in step 3 
for this particular situation.  [B: If an indemnity is retrieved from the insurance 
account in this period, then the insurance premium in the next period increases 
by 2 points.  If no indemnity is retrieved, the insurance premium in the next 
period decreases by 1 point.] 
After the last period, the second part of the experiment will start, and you will have to 
answer several questions.  After you have filled in the questionnaire on the computer, you 
will receive detailed information regarding the balance of the insurance account, your earned 
points and your payment in Euros.  
Please pack up your personal belongings after the experiment and sit quietly in your 
seat.  We will call you in a random order to collect your payment outside the lab room.  
Thank you for your participation. 
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